HIMALAYA, the Journal of the
Association for Nepal and
Himalayan Studies
Volume 35

Number 2

Article 11

January 2016

Reconsidering State-Society Relations in South Asia: A Himalayan
Case Study
Sanjog Rupakheti
Loyola University New Orleans, srupakhe@loyno.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.macalester.edu/himalaya

Recommended Citation
Rupakheti, Sanjog. 2016. Reconsidering State-Society Relations in South Asia: A Himalayan Case Study.
HIMALAYA 35(2).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.macalester.edu/himalaya/vol35/iss2/11

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License.
This Research Article is brought to you for free and open access by the DigitalCommons@Macalester College at
DigitalCommons@Macalester College. It has been accepted for inclusion in HIMALAYA, the Journal of the Association
for Nepal and Himalayan Studies by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@Macalester College. For more
information, please contact scholarpub@macalester.edu.

Reconsidering State-Society Relations in South Asia: A Himalayan Case Study
Acknowledgements
I acknowledge with gratitude the support and guidance of Sumit Guha and Indrani Chatterjee on the larger
research project, from which this article is drawn. For their careful and insightful suggestions on the
earlier drafts, I thank Ashley Howard, Paul Buehler, and the two anonymous reviewers of Himalaya. I am
especially grateful to Catherine Warner and Arik Moran (editors of this special issue), for their meticulous
work on the earlier drafts. Any remaining mistakes and omissions are entirely my own.

This research article is available in HIMALAYA, the Journal of the Association for Nepal and Himalayan Studies:
https://digitalcommons.macalester.edu/himalaya/vol35/iss2/11

Reconsidering State-Society Relations in South Asia:
A Himalayan Case Study

Sanjog Rupakheti

Since the mid-eighteenth century when armies
serving the English East India Company (EIC)
clashed with the Gorkhali power, British
officers depicted Nepal as an example of
classical Hindu despotism. Subsequent
scholars of the region have not quite challenged
these representations, mostly taking such
colonial descriptors as ‘facts.’
This essay demonstrates that the Nepali state
evolved through methods of rule rather than
through the performance of rituals and war. It
traces a brief trajectory of the development
of the Gorkhali legal sovereignty by examining
the processes of governance including alliance
building, management of disputes, and
rationalization of administrative, and judicial
structures.

population, in the attempt to redress wrongs,
particularly problematizes the received notion
of that society being ruled by arbitrary system.
Repeated emphasis on justice administration
enabled the Gorkhali state to simultaneously
incorporate multifarious groups into its
expanding network through grants and titles,
and subordinate them to rules created at
the center. The essay offers glimpses into a
state that was simultaneously coercive and
consensual, extractive and re-distributive.
Keywords: caste, justice, kingship, law, Nepal, state.

I argue that the frequency and volume of
petitions to royal authority made by the
subjects from a cross-section of Nepali
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Introduction
Nepal’s ‘non-coloniality’ has often precluded its comparability to the larger sub-continental historic experience in
the scholarship (Des Chene 2007). Ironically, the colonial
knowledge regimes operating from India were at the
forefront of generating the earliest and most authoritative accounts of Nepal.1 The military and administrative
officers of the East India Company (EIC) traversing the
foothills of the Himalayas provided the first paradigmatic
interpretation of the modern Nepali polity (Hamilton 1819;
Kirkpatrick 1971; Hogdson 1880). Borrowing heavily from
the ubiquitous template of ‘Oriental Despotism’ in Asia, the
EIC depicted Gorkhali rulers too as quintessential Hindu
tyrants for whom violence was innate not instrumental.2
Particularly, the EIC accounts emphasized the ‘savage’ nature and ‘oppressive’ violence of its emerging rival, as both
competed for territory along the Himalayan corridor in the
wake of receding Mughal authority. Subsequent scholars
of the region have not quite challenged these representations, taking such colonial descriptors at face value.3
Nationalist historians on the other hand have glorified the
Gorkhali military conquests as constituting the fulcrum
of its sovereignty, and assigned it the honorable title of
‘unification’. In nationalist narratives, ‘unification’ appears
as a logical telos uniting a fragmented nation, guiding it to
modernity (Pant 1985; D. R. Regmi 1975; Shah 1990).4 Yet
this representation of the state as a sovereign historical
object and a collective subject of modernity elides a rather
complex trajectory of its formation and evolution. Both
the nationalist and the colonial representations of Nepal
do not examine state building as a process, the outcomes
of which were not pre-ordained but contingent (Michael
1999; Onta 1995).
Mahesh C. Regmi, who offered the first sustained critique
of the nationalist narrative, placed the land-tax nexus at
the center of the Nepali state-making account (M. C. Regmi
1963; 1971). The doyen of Nepali economic history however held the ‘motely character’ of the land tenures and tax
assessments as illustrative of a state marked by unpredictability and extractive nature (Regmi 1977: 51). Regmi
argued that the lack of private property in land, arbitrary
rules, and oppressive tax demands on peasantry precluded
the growth of a strong state. Regmi’s firm focus on land
tenures and the policy driven nature of his works prevented him from evaluating differential systems of labor, dues,
and rights operating under the ambit of the evolving state
power to which he inadvertently imputed a despotic character.5 An explicit economic determinism underpinning his
works did not challenge the prevailing imagery of Nepal as
a static society caught in tyranny and disconnected from
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its rulers. Few western scholars have documented the
post-1816 state as a qualitatively different entity (Burghart
1984; English 1985). Notwithstanding the importance of the
Treaty of Sagauli (1816), these scholars however did not
fully explain (beyond theoretical speculations) as to how
the Anglo-Gorkha War engendered concrete steps towards
Gorkhali state-making from within.6 Locating the agency
of change in Nepali society elsewhere equally risks missing
the deeper and indigenous roots of Gorkhali power extending back into the eighteenth century. Some influential
bodies of anthropological works on Nepal have alternatively underscored the role of rituals in the making of Gorkhali
kingship and state (Höfer 1979; Lecomte-Tilouine 2009;
Michaels 2005; Quigley 2005). However, the general conclusions of these works have not moved the debate away from
the Dumontian and Hocartian paradigms of power.7 This
has particularly overshadowed the study of the 1854 Ain,
which remains prodigiously focused on caste hierarchy
and its associated purity.8 As a result, the conspicuous role
played by administrative legislations in regulating wide
arrays of socio-economic relations in nineteenth century
Nepal remains poorly examined.
Without dismissing the role played by the early Gorkhali military success, this essay proposes an alternative
narrative of Gorkhali rule wherein Gorkhali manipulation
of social and cultural practices played an important role
in molding the building blocks of the state alongside the
management of land and rituals. It particularly sheds light
on aspects of state-society relations that have hitherto
warranted the least attention, especially those pertaining
to the construction of early state authority. I hope to show
that the foundations of the Gorkhali state were built on the
projection of its legal sovereignty that encompassed both
secular and religious aspects of social life. From the closing
decades of the eighteenth century, the nascent kingdom
expanded its judicial power to check both official irregularities and manage a gamut of social relations. Overtime,
the Gorkhali emphasis on building legitimacy through
deliverance of justice and regulation of intimate aspects of
social lives bonded diverse populations to the state on the
one hand, and became a vehicle to project power in areas
controlled by competing groups on the other.
It was not simply centralization of rituals and taxes, but
also of information, loyalty, and justice administration
that deepened Gorkhali sovereignty in rural Nepal. For
sovereignty to be effective at the grassroots it had to be
relatable in everyday life and imagination. The swiftness
and impartiality with which the state delivered justice
rooted it in popular imagination, and the resulting order
was processual—not homeostatic.

Markers of Early Gorkhali Rule: Whose Leviathan?
When the small chiefdom of Gorkha emerged into a large
territorial unit during the mid-eighteenth century, it had
to accommodate various local power holders (Acharya &
Naraharinath 2061 VS: 44). The immense ethnic, geographic, cultural, and administrative diversity on the ground
thwarted immediate Gorkhali endeavors to radically alter
existing socio-economic relations.9 Time and again, the
Gorkhali state relied on different strata of society to carry
out administrative and judicial functions.10 One Bhagavantanath, who had assisted Prithvi Narayan in his various
territorial campaigns, was awarded with lavish titles and
land grants, including rights to judiciary functions (Vajracarya 1975: 98-101). The fact that the descendants of the
several vanquished chiefs continued to receive large sums
of cash pension from the state throughout the nineteenth
and into the twentieth century shows that collaboration
was a defining feature of Gorkhali statecraft.11 It seems
that since any larger political entity had to be built out of
negotiations with hundreds of local power holders, village
headmen, and revenue officials, the terms of social relations and power hierarchies largely remained embedded
in the existing system (Vajracarya & Nepal 2014 VS: 25).
This necessity to collaborate extended beyond the context
of controlling the Kathmandu Valley (Naraharinath 2022
VS: 16-17). In the Eastern region, local village headmen and
chiefs were granted considerable autonomy in return for
accepting Gorkhali authority. Any attempt to undermine
the existing balance of power in rural Nepal was swiftly
addressed. For instance, in 1793 upon being informed of
the irregularity committed by an official, Ram Das, in the
registration of kipat (system of land tenure) holdings, the
state intervened swiftly.12 In addition to returning the kipat
land, the Rai (local ruling elites) were given the authority
to collect fines, and oversee general administration.13 The
Gorkhali rulers likewise brought military ascetic fraternities, Tharus (ethnic group) and various other groups from
the old power centers in the southern plains into the ambit
of their expanding network (Guneratne 2002; Shrestha
2058 VS).
Let us briefly look at some of these examples. In 1792 the
Kathmandu Durbar restored the property of Jarobar Khawas who had served the Sen kings of Makwanpur.14 Jarobar
Khawas was later incorporated into the Gorkhali state as
a Subba (governor) of Saptari and Mahottari districts in
the Terai.15 A few years later, in 1798, the state made a
lavish grant of 301 bighas (measurement of land= 5/8 acre)
in Rautahat district to Gosain (ascetic order) Jamuna Giri,
entrusting him with settling virgin lands and overseeing
judicial and administrative functions.16 Since the success
of early state-building relied on the political incorpora-

tion of multitudes of intermediaries anchored on an idea
of shared sovereignty, these recipients of Gorkhali titles
and grants were more than just office-holders. They were
“partners and co-sharers of the realm”, acting as a vital
link between the state and society (Wink 1986: 187), a point
aptly summarized in a letter of Prithvi Narayan Shah to the
king of Jajarkot in 1769 (Naraharinath 1966: 4).17 Through
much of the eighteenth century, the Gorkhali rulers relied
on many such intermediary groups to collect tax and oversee law and order (RRC 34: 295-296). And while in theory
the king was supposed to be the sole owner of the land, the
majority of cultivable lands were already in the hereditary
possession of various social groups.18 Any new transfer
of unclaimed or forested land to groups or individuals
carried the clear title of proprietorship as long as the land
remained cultivated. A large chunk of the revenue thus
went to various intermediaries, rural magnates, and local
elites. Most administrative functions too were left to the
local rulers and there is no evidence of systematic checks
against embezzlement before 1780.19 Depending on the severity of the case, the regime at most warned the accused
not to repeat it. One could draw here a parallel between
Guha’s description of the eighteenth century Maratha state
and the early nineteenth century Gorkhali system. Both
were characterized by wide discretion and great latitude
that was “diffused among a variety of institutions and
shared by many different persons” (Guha 1995: 126).
While these structures of collaborations enabled the
Kathmandu based authority to control vast territories
without large administrative footprints, the system had
its limitations too, namely in the state’s limited control
over resources and population. As Chris Bayly has perceptively pointed out in the case of India, the push and pull
between centripetal and centrifugal forces soon began to
confront the Gorkhali rulers (Bayly 1983: 5-11). On top of
the embezzlement of resources, the state increasingly had
to contend with local elites who frequently diverted labor
from directly administered land to their territories.20 Given
that labor was already in short supply in the Tarai, repeated violations posed a grave challenge to expanding state
power in this fertile region.21 In the hills, indiscriminate
extraction of labor by the local rulers likewise threatened the state’s access to its essential labor needs.22 The
growing military threat posed by the expanding EIC and
escalating inter-family power struggles only compounded
the situation. Gorkhali rulers faced with such exigencies
gradually initiated administrative and legal steps to assert
state authority in order to mitigate centrifugal tendencies
both within and outside the Durbar. King Rana Bahadur’s
abdication letter of 1798 offers some glimpses into one
such early attempt. Outlining specific procedures for
HIMALAYA Volume 35, Number 2 | 75

renewing office titles and grants, the letter pressed officials to remain loyal to the dhungo (state). It specifically
stipulated that loyalty and honesty be rewarded, and called
on officials to administer justice only from the court in the
presence of other officials.23 The edict further entrusted
loyal state officials to check irregularities, corruption and
local excesses (Nepali 2057 VS: 113-114). The Pajani (annual
review of office) system allowed to flush out recalcitrant
local rulers and bring in trusted dependents and supporters. Under this system, the lands and titles assigned to every office-holder were renewed annually.24 Herein we have
evidence of an early attempt to penetrate local society not
through a coercive force, but through an invocation of
righteousness and justice.
As early as the beginning of the nineteenth century, the
Gorkhali rulers sought to project state power through
written laws.25 The construction of the Gorkhali authority
seems to have functioned along two axes. It simultaneously incorporated multifarious groups on one axis of
its expanding network through grants and titles, while
subordinating them to rules crafted at the center on the
other. To ensure the speedy delivery of administrative
orders, the Gorkhali rulers regularly dispatched trusted individuals directly from the Durbar. For instance, one Shree
Ram Khatri was deputed to the region west of Marsyangdi
and east of Kumaon in 1798 to record local grievances and
measure the effectiveness of regulations sent from Kathmandu. Khatri was given wide-ranging powers to check
tax records, judicial processes, and to measure conformity
to state sanctioned rules.26 One of his duties was to listen
to people and record their grievances and complaints
that were to be brought to the Palace for scrutiny, while
judges who delayed passing verdicts were to be severely
punished. Justice deliverance thus provided an ideological
basis to re-work pre-existing relations of power, and to
establish a closer relationship with rural populations.27
Regulating Society, Building State Authority
The extant study of the Gorkhali state is influenced by the
larger corpus of historical and anthropological work on
Indian kingship (Appadurai 1977; Dirks 1987; Raheja 1988;
Stein 1980; Dumont 1970; Hocart 1927). These studies have
underscored gift-giving and ritual performance as constitutive of South Asian kingship. A fixation with rituals and
gift-giving as the defining axis of kingship has conversely
limited our understanding of both state and caste formations in South Asia. Nicholas Dirks, whose otherwise influential work on the South Indian kingdom of Puddukotai
that offered a critique of Dumont by interlinking political
and ritual spheres, ended up emphasizing the cultural
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production of kingship via gift-giving at the expense of
considerations of political economy. As Sumit Guha has
pointed out, Dirks leaves “the social basis of the king’s
power unclear” despite the fact that “Indian texts from
early times knew that the king was but one element of
the state and could not work without others” (Guha 2013:
40). This latter point is amply demonstrated in the case
of Nepal, where Gorkhali kings succeeded in projecting
sovereignty through the intertwined strategies of literary and religious patronage, code promulgation, and the
political manipulation of ritual and rank only by operating
as the nucleus of complex and competing networks of kin,
powerful individuals, sects, clients, and dependents. It was
through such networks that they effectively projected
power, accumulated information and resources, and ultimately secured loyalty.
State authority in Nepal, similar to the rest of pre-colonial
South Asia, was not embodied in an individual monarch,
who wielded and imposed pervasive power on hapless
subjects. Neither did an individual ascend to the throne
merely by virtue of descent.28 Even the question of primogeniture remained a contested field.29 An important
work on gender and kinship formations in Muslim royal
households also underscores this point for pre-colonial
South Asia (Chatterjee 1999). State power was expressed
and acted out through coalitions of individuals and groups
comprising men and women from various lineages and
strata of Gorkhali society. Having come to power with
the help of powerful clans, the House of Gorkha since its
inception in 1559 remained deeply embedded in a broad
network of families (Baral 1964).
As in Mughal India, individuals who aspired to become
kings could not do so without building alliances with their
kin, important men, and powerful women both within and
outside of royal households (Faruqi 2012). Over time, such
alliances and networks became the substance and sinews
of the House of Gorkha. The Gorkhali state with the king
at its head and supported by a network of dependents and
supporters thus oversaw the maintenance of social order
by extending gifts, but more importantly also by handing
out punishment, sanctioning expiations, and overseeing
caste purity in its legislative and judicial capacities. Purification and expiation were however not only about meeting
certain religious requirements as laid down in the classical
law books, but were important sources of revenue and
labor for the regime and its households, and official salaries were frequently drawn out from these fines.30 Various
edicts and orders issued by different Gorkhali rulers thus
illustrate explicit political-economic considerations of projecting sovereignty, which in remote regions depended on

casting a wide network of trusted individuals and groups
(secular and religious alike) both within and outside of the
royal households (Wasti 2066 VS).

people of different cultic traditions, and traders from as far
as Armenia, Tibet, and India crisscrossed the region (Vanini 1977). State authority had to encompass them all.

For example, as a part of the land grant that Gosain Hulas
Giri received in the Bara and Rautahat region of the Tarai,
he was required to build a monastery and settle people.
Hulas Giri was also instructed to offer food and shelter to
paupers and pilgrims.31 The public performance of religion thus seems to have transcended the religious realm
and to have been tied to considerations of state-making.
In bringing previously unused land into cultivation, such
grants expanded the tentacles of state power (Guneratne
2002: 56). Many state-supported pioneers in the Tarai in
the process of clearing forest with new settlements fused
the three separate frontiers of politics, economics, and
religion into one.32 The Gorkhali state gradually brought
those ritual gifts too within its legal and administrative
purview.33 Brahmins receiving priesthood titles were subjected to the regulatory power of the state and were often
required to keep detailed information on ritual expenses
and to provide relevant receipts to the state.34 The state
even outlined categories of rituals, tabulating the precise
amounts for procuring goods and services.35 Nor did the
one time granting of lands or titles preclude the House of
Gorkha from intervening in family disputes, succession
rules, inheritance, and local excesses (Bouillier 1993; 1991).
While the recipients of the religious grants were allowed
to oversee minor infractions, the state reserved the sole
prerogatives to decide on important cases. Violations of
established marriage norms and venality risked grants
being taken away from their recipients.36 To that end, even
the highest ranked religious officials who failed to offer
stipulated services were not spared the state’s cudgel.37

Building a successful network entailed more than just
awarding grants and patronage; it concurrently involved
a complex process of managing different groups’ claims to
past rights and services. For example, when Subba Jarobar
Khawas took the birta (tax free land) grant of Shakti Balbanda Upadhyaya in 1792, the reigning king re-issued the
grant and ordered Khawas to stop troubling Shakti.41 Similarly, when Laxmi Dhar Pandit of Tanahu and Goreshwor
Aryal of Makwanpur appealed to the Durbar respectively
claiming their ancestral rights to the same land, the latter
ruled in favor of Laxmi Dhar Pandit and ordered Dinanath
Upadhyaya, an officer deputed to the region, to hand over
the land and any outstanding income to Laxmi Dhar.42 In
due time, through successful management of such rights
and claims, the nascent Gorkhali state expanded its reach
to encompass many aspects of the socio-economic order.

At the same time, when secular officials encroached on
religious endowments, the state intervened swiftly to
protect such property.38 Interestingly, the Gorkhali kings
time and again endowed and patronized temples, monasteries, mosques, and ascetic shelters irrespective of their
individual beliefs. In 1791 the state awarded a grant to
one Chabang Nyamgyal Lama to perform the “daily ritual
of the Lord Buddha,” and also authorized him to collect
different levies to maintain the monastery.39 Similar patronage was extended to the descendants of the Kashmiri
trader Sadullah Mojoamji, who were granted the authority
to enjoy the property and oversee the Muslim holy shrine
adjacent to Rani Pokhari (Panta 1968: 1059). The state also
patronized different shamanic and animistic practices.40
These evidences render the concept of a ‘Hindu-only’
system rather quixotic (Levi 2005). It speaks to a growing
cosmopolitanism that marked the Gorkha kingdom where

By the closing decade of the eighteenth century the scope
of regulatory orders and codes had increased considerably.
In 1791, the state drew the attention of officers in Saptari to hardships suffered by tenants with the imposition
of ritual fees.43 The following year, the subba (official) of
Saptari and Mahottari districts were ordered to investigate complaints against local notables and to bring back
the tenants who had fled from leasehold lands.44 When
excesses committed by the local amali (tax collectors) led
to depopulation in Tarai, the state immediately dismissed
the said officials and replaced them with new amali.45 Soon
the Gorkhali state began regulating inheritance rules,
procedures for criminal trials, caste boundaries, and labor
relations. This in turn expanded the reaches of the House
of Gorkha to the intimate domains of households.46 For instance, adoption systems and marriage rules were brought
under the purview of the central regime overriding
customary practices.47 The ability to shape many different
social relations transformed the state into the ultimate
guarantor and protector of rights against both familial and
local threats in rural areas. This presented the state with a
unique administrative and fiscal power to manage all kinds
of socio-economic disputes. For instance, when a widowed
Brahmin woman who was denied her husband’s property
by her brother-in-law approached the Durbar, the state
ruled in her favor by stipulating that as long as the woman
remained loyal to her dead husband, she alone had the
right to her dead husband’s property.48 This decision, while
seemingly benevolent, in fact denied the woman’s right
to property in case of re-marriage or a relationship with
another man. Such highly gendered language and decision
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vis-à-vis property inheritance was structured to maintain
the boundaries of both caste and wealth, underscoring
the centrality of marriage in the creation of rank and title
that scholars have often overlooked (Rupakheti 2012). The
growing power of the state even enabled it to gradually
ignore customs and traditions as it expanded its bureaucratic and administrative muscles.49
Especially in cases on property transactions, which were
often marked by competing claims, adjudications offered the state rare access to the inner domains of family
relations, and became a major source of revenue. Caste
regulations were another avenue through which the state
expanded into the hinterland, where it came to control aspects of social life that had earlier been under the purview
of local communities. Governing caste was invariably tied
to the labor and fiscal needs of the Gorkhali state (Hamilton 1971: 218). For instance, a decision to impose fines on
Bhote and Murmi castes for consuming beef meat seems
hardly to have been driven by religious prejudice alone, as
a large sum of revenue was passed on to the Durbar from
its enforcement.50 Not surprisingly, the state preferred
imposing fines to instating a blanket prohibitory order,
which remained a favored method in Bhadgaon as late as
1809. Though killing of cows were prohibited after 1806 in
Solukhumbu region, the order allowed for several exceptions (Ortner 1978: 17).51 Given the regular need of animal
hides in state munitions, an absolute ban was not desirable.
Thus, when the local officials punished the carrion-eating
groups in the area around Rukum’s munitions factory, the
regime in Kathmandu reprimanded the officials. It ruled
that as long as the respective groups provided hides to
the local munitions factory they should not be fined and
demanded that any fines collected be returned.52 However,
those failing to supply the stipulated animal products were
liable to financial dues.53
By linking rights to perform certain labor services to a new
symbolic order, the emerging state re-defined caste-state
relations. One 1805 order outlined new dietary and eligibility criterion for Gurungs to participate in the military
labor market.54 In doing so, wide-ranging commensal
practices were simply subsumed under a state rule thereby
overriding complex internal group stratification (Pignede
1962; Ragsdale 1990). This also prevented the diversion
of precious resources from adjudicating sub-jati (caste)
disputes and conflicts.55 Such linking of economic and
political rights to certain ritual and dietary requirements
soon set in process an internal regulation by the members
themselves (Nepali 2022 VS: 191).56
Nor were higher-ranked groups exempted from such policing. When Jaisi Brahmins in 1812 were found to have not
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observed the caste and professional code of conduct (earlier legislated by Prithvi Narayan Shah), new regulations
were issued detailing which segments of the community
were allowed to teach the Vedas or accept religious donations (Acharya 2061 VS: 519-525; J.C. Regmi 2036 VS: 202203). Though they were allowed to oversee ritual functions
at their own homes, they were not to perform any rituals
elsewhere. Likewise the Dharmadhikari (ritual preceptors),
as salaried employees of the state, were required to follow
state approved guidelines in overseeing caste related cases.
Social relations were not trans-historical fossilized entities;
instead they were reshaped and sustained through elaborate legal provisions in the thick of state-making. Given
the centrality of artisanal labor in the state-making process, the state often dealt with them directly. For example,
some blacksmith families were given the right to collect
levies on ploughs in return for offering their labor to the
state-operated munitions factories.57 In a similar fashion,
one Bhaju Ram Nau was given authority to oversee all the
members of the barber caste in the Gorkhali domain; in return he was required to supply barbers to the troops across
the kingdom as needed.58 Ram Din Mochi and Hima Mochi
in another instance were granted authority to oversee all
the leatherworkers between Bara-Parsa in the west and
Bardiya in the east.59 The two grantees were ordered to
perform their traditional duty and supply hides as directed
by state officials. Likewise Chudyaras (Muslim bangles makers) were exempted from forced labor and allotted jagir
(emolument) land in return for pledge to supply bangles
to the Palace.60 The gift giving thus incorporated not just
the powerful but also the powerless as the state was being
constituted.
Technologies of Governance
The administration of justice under Gorkhali kingship has
received little attention in historiography. As early as 1805,
courts were established in the mofussil (countryside), by
which time Kathmandu already had four major courts with
clearly demarcated judicial and administrative duties (J.
C. Regmi 1979). Following the establishments of mofussil
courts, the judges appointed to the mid-western region
were ordered to refer to royal decrees when adjudicating
cases, thereby overriding the prevailing practice of letting
the local potentates oversee such functions.61 Judges were
also required to bring all the disputing parties to the court
and weigh their testimonies before passing verdicts.62 By
stipulating procedures and punishments in advance, the
state hoped to close off the possibility of misappropriation
and individual rendering of verdicts, thus limiting local
officials’ capacity to manipulate the outcome of judicial
cases for financial and personal gains. To ensure that the

appointed judges abided by the written stipulations two
additional individuals were deputed in the region.63 This
redundancy in administrative duties was an intentional
and common practice that served as a check on officials.64
From the second decade of the nineteenth century, the
rulers in Kathmandu began to bar local rulers from overseeing cases of pancha-khat (major offenses).65 Judges were
dispatched regularly from the center to preside over and
collect fines related to serious crimes. A closer examination of these administrative-legal interventions offers
glimpses into Gorkhali innovations in governance. In 1811,
when the state discovered that local elites in Garhwal
had resorted to the extra-judicial enslavement of sexual
offenders, it set new rules for handling sexual offences
that disallowed local rulers to enslave offenders.66 Only the
state reserved the right to enslave people for sexual offenses, and such enslaved individuals were frequently employed for both productive and reproductive labor in the
palace complexes.67 In cases where local headmen colluded
with regional officers, locals were encouraged to report
the excesses at the Durbar. Thus, when the people of Theni
complained against their local magistrate, the regime recalled the latter and assigned the villages in thek-bandi (tax
farming).68 Later when the local people again complained
that the jetha buda (village headman) exacted more than
the amount allowed in the contract, the center instructed
a different judge, Hira Nanda Jaisi, to look into the matter and to report the case to Durbar through judge Jalim
Singh.69 The Gorkhali rulers likewise did not hesitate to
deal with the highest-ranking officials who overstepped
their official boundaries, as evinced in Kaji (minister) Jash
Upadhyaya being warned for punishing tax-paying tenants
in Chayanpur.70 Upadhyaya had gone against convention
by charging additional fees for renewing the tenants’ contract, and the local collective Limbu-Subba-Rai elites had
accordingly informed the state of his misdeeds. Upadhyaya
was then ordered to return all the fines immediately and
warned of severe punishment should complaints against
him recur. In another instance, when the locals of Doti
complained to the Durbar of illegal dues demanded by one
blacksmith Dilyalo on the instruction of royal kin member
Pushkar Shah, the state instructed Shah to replace the
blacksmith and return the collected dues to the villagers.71
Similarly, when the state discovered in 1819 that local
power holders in Majh-Kirat had gone about punishing
people as they pleased, it issued a detailed description to
the petitioning state officials to oversee criminal cases and
exact the appropriate punishment. It is worth mentioning
that the key component of the order was only the state appointed judges were authorized to oversee criminal cases
as outlined in the regulation.72

The power and the swiftness with which the regime intervened in local affairs achieved several targets. First, it
allowed the ruling families to regulate and control many
different aspects of society. As the frequency of such complaints increased it allowed the nascent state to expand its
administrative and bureaucratic arms. Second, by frequently punishing officials, the regime was able to localize
such excesses and project itself as the ultimate authority
while obfuscating the structural inequality built in the system.73 An important regulation from 1826 outlined an organized approach to check the power of the highest-ranking
officials who had hitherto escaped prosecution owing to
their status (HMG 2022 VS: 704-706). Dal Bhanjan Pandey
was appointed to oversee the prosecution of state officials
regardless of the status of the petitioner. The order tasked
Pandey to weigh evidence and oral testimonies from both
sides before deciding a case. In addition to the emphasis on evidence, two key features stand out in this royal
regulation: the invocation of the idea of loyalty not to a
particular ruler but to the state, and the reliance on nonkin members to oversee this important judiciary process
(Nepali 1965: 20). This continued emphasis on loyalty and
the incorporation of both personnel and regulations in the
emerging state system enabled the Gorkhali rulers to bring
in trusted administrators to take charge of various judicial
affairs.
Another important charter that was granted to Prime
Minister Rana Jung Pandey in 1837 reminded him to resist
the influence of royal collaterals, priests, and high-ranking
officials in judicial decisions.74 Such legislative orders suggest the state was not likely to have been perceived as the
ruthless, unapproachable power it has often been depicted
as. For instance, when a dispute broke out between two
Lamas over the rights to priestly functions in the region
of Atharasayakhola, each called on the state to resolve the
matter. After carefully examining the oral and documentary evidence, the state awarded the rights to the family of
Dorje Lama.75 The rural population frequently called on the
state to protect its traditional rights and titles from attacks
within and outside of the concerned families. An aggrieved
party unsatisfied with the local resolution or with the
verdict of court could then approach the Durbar. In this
regard, one of the responses to Hogdson’s questionnaire is
revealing here.76 Hogdson’s Nepali informers, commenting
on the authority of the judges in the Nepali court, drew an
interesting contrast with the European system to highlight
that the judges’ decisions were not final, and could be appealed to the Durbar (Hogdson 1880: 211-250). But Hogdson
and subsequent scholars failed to probe this layered aspect
of the Nepali justice system. People, driven by a confidence in the power of state to right the wrong committed
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by even the highest-ranking officials, often traveled a
considerable distance in pursuit of justice. This is evident
in the complaint of two individuals from the central Terai
against Dalmardan Shah, an influential member of the
Gorkha royalty, whom they claimed had unlawfully confiscated their land and manipulated local judicial process
in his favor.77 After dispatching officials from the center to
look into the matter, the Durbar eventually restored the
confiscated property. When another high-ranking state official encroached on Guthi (religious) land in 1819 and the
custodians of the title travelled to Durbar seeking justice,
the state looking into the matter immediately restored the
property.78 Such periodic interventions by the state gradually built its legitimacy in rural areas to project itself as the
ultimate fountain of justice.
Over time, such relations became the vehicle for expanding the nascent state’s power into areas that were historically dominated by competing interest groups. It was not
the performance of elaborate Vedic rituals and temple
building projects, but rather politically crafted legal-administrative interventions at the center that rooted the
Gorkhali state in its wider social milieu. Both colonial administrators and modern scholars, in focusing on the ‘Hindu’ aspects of laws and polity, have missed the ‘great arch’
of the nineteenth century Himalayan state-making project.79 The foregoing discussion dispels the static notion of
rule in eighteenth and nineteenth century Nepal to complicate the dominant and exclusive image of the ‘state’ as
a revenue sponge. Nepali state not only collected revenue,
but also legislated, adjudicated, gathered information, and
penetrated local society to build its sovereignty. A brief
discussion of state-society relations addressed in this essay
should allow for re-thinking colonialism or modernization
(post-1951) as the only harbingers of change in Nepal. As
Indrani Chatterjee demonstrates in a recent monograph on
monastic governmentality, the elision of local agency from
the pre-colonial period has done epistemic violence to the
South Asian past (Chatterjee 2013). A careful reading of
indigenous sources is one way to re-conceptualize multiple
locations of change in South Asian societies.
Conclusion
The early modern Gorkha state is best understood if we
move beyond the paradigms set by colonial and nationalist scholarship. It was a state built out of negotiations
and accommodations with various individuals and groups
that was deeply entangled with—and drew legitimacy
from—local and existing relations of power. While conquests and military campaigns played a supportive role,
social control and consolidation of regime power could
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not proceed solely on the heels of war machines. Instead,
it involved a complex process of managing past claims to
rights, regulating social order, and legislating a series of
administrative and judicial functions. The absorption of
numerous intermediaries during the formative state of
the state-building process represents a range of political
priorities and suggests a state being constructed from
bottom up, just as several important works have illustrated
for different regions across South Asia (Bayly 1983; Hasan
2004; Kulke 1995; Wink 1986; Yang 1989).
As it responded to its entanglement with internal and
external social forces, the Gorkhali state put together,
piece by piece, a novel Hindu polity out of a plural society along the Himalayan foothills. The management of
rituals, embedded in the politico-economic imperatives of
the period, was an important source of revenue and labor
for the state and its households. Thus the control of that
domain remained intimately tied to the regulation of social
order and rank that underlay eighteenth century Gorkhali
state-making, which parallels similar developments in the
Maratha polity (Fukazawa 1998; Guha 2013). Like many
pre-colonial societies in South Asia, the early Gorkhali
state was simultaneously coercive and consensual, extractive and re-distributive, and it also incorporated lower
strata of society with various incentives to tap artisanal
labor, particularly echoing Sahai’s work on pre-colonial
Rajasthan (Sahai 2006).80 Most importantly, the frequency and volume of complaints reaching the Durbar from a
cross-section of Nepali population equally problematizes
the received notion of that society being ruled by arbitrary
system. State-building in Nepal, as has been demonstrated
in other regions throughout the subcontinent, was marked
by the expansion of both legal and moral authority of the
state that came to encompass many aspects of socio-political lives (Guha 2003; Singh 2003). Gorkhali statecraft,
being built on a justice administration with interventions,
including but not limited to the realm of caste and rituals,
was reflective of the ongoing attempts made by various
regional rulers to project sovereignty in the midst of
political-economic flux of the eighteenth century (Guha
2013; Peabody 2002; Rai 2004; Wink 1981). The examples
explored here thus signal remarkable continuities in the
social-political histories of Himalayan terrain with that of
the peninsular societies. In briefly highlighting one such
interconnectedness along the Himalayan foothills, the
essay urges scholars of South Asia—in particular nationalist and post-colonial historians—to not treat colonial and
national boundaries as being impermeable to history.
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1. For a broader discussion on the colonial informational
regimes, see (Bayly 2007; Cohn 1996; Inden 1990).
2. HC/Vol. 1, ff: 27-29.
3. This picture of the Gorkhali state remains a dominant
leitmotif in some of the recent works too. See (Riaz & Basu
2007).
4. D. R. Regmi wrote, “Prithvi Narayan Shah was a
nationalist at the core of his heart. With him, if conquest
was the aim of life, patriotism was the guiding factor for
any action”. See (D. R. Regmi, 1975: 100).
5. See (Regmi, 1963 [1977]: 10-11).
6. Richard Burghart’s now widely cited work on the
Nepali state-formation is one such example of theoretical
speculation. Burghart’s central argument that the Nepali
rulers made categorical distinction between three
different notions of their realm is not much supported by
the administrative and legislative records.
7. It is also important to emphasize that there are notable
exceptions to this, in particular the works of David
Holmberg (1989) on Tamang, Arjun Guneratne (2002)
on Tharus, and Nancy Levine (1987). These illustrate
the political-economic forces in the formation of ethnic
identities in Nepal.
8. Few works published in Nepali language have discussed
the political-economic aspects of law making in the Ain.
See (Gautam 2004; Pangeni 2007).
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holders of Dolkha in Eastern Nepal is evident in 1760. See
(Vajracarya & Gyanmani Nepal 2014 BS: 25).
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11. NT/1907 BS, ff: 3-4; Rajpatra/2019 BS [1962], Vol.3, No:
7, ff: 2-3.
12. “Order to Ram Das to reinstate the Kipat Holdings”.
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of Kipat system, see (Forbes 1995).
13. “Order to Dev Pati Rai, Sakha Rai, Jab Jit Rai”. LM/1849.
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Khawas”. LM/1848 BS [1791-92] PN. 6, SN. 1996. Sen
Dynasty of Makwanpur was a powerful chiefdom that was
in competition with the House of Gorkha to control the
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Saptari and Mahottari”. LM/1848 BS [1791-92] PN. 3.
16. “Land Grant to Gosain Jamuna Giri”. LM/1855-56 BS
[1798-1799]. On the role of Gosain in South Asian state
formations see (Pinch 2006).
17. “We confirm your ancestral authority within your
territory, including your authority to award capital
punishment, upgrade or degrade caste, collect levies
to finance the sacred thread investiture ceremonies
and weddings of royal prince and princess and fees for
the expiation of caste offenses. We also confirm your
authority to grant or confiscate birta lands and to collect
judicial fines, escheats and fees for stamping weights and
measures. You shall pay only Rs. 701 whenever a new King
ascends our throne. When a new King ascends your throne,
you shall have authority to collect customary payments
from your people.”
18. This parallels similar agrarian relations prevalent in
the pre-colonial Maratha state (Grover 2006).
19. “Regulations for Tarai”. LM/1837 BS [1780-1781], PN.
83, SN. 5175.
20. “Order highlighting the problem of labor shortage in
Terai”. LM/1866 BS [1809-1810], BN. 29, PN. 8, SN. 33, f. 26.
21. LM/1849 BS [1791-1792], PN 3. The order assures
the tenants who have fled to return and pay a fixed tax
rate with protection against future exploitations by local
amalidars.
22. “Order to local potentates not to extract unpaid labor”.
LM/1865 BS [1808-1809], PN. 6, SN. 1996, f. 61.
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23. Prithvi Narayan Shah, in his Divya Upadesh, had made
similar pleas to his descendants and trusted officials to
deliver justice through court system. To ensure state
impartiality in judicial process, he even warned not to
deposit the revenue thus collected to the state treasury.
See (Acharya & Naraharinath 2061 BS: 47).
24. Subba Dasarath Khatri was instructed to award offices
to those who took the initiative in settling virgin land.
The royal order also approved the pajani register prepared
by Khatri for the districts of Bara, Parsa and Rautahat.
LM/1851 BS [1794-1795], PN. 83, SN. 5103.
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fixing of interest rates, and checks on local excesses, the
code was unprecedented at the time. (See Panta 2026 BS).
26. LM/1855 BS [1798].
27. “Order granting Ijara to Darbi Singh Newar”. In the
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output. LM/1850 BS [1793], BN.4, PN. 1, SN. 6.
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(Peabody 2003: 37-49).
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BS).
30. DNA/11/47. Jai Nar Singh Newar was awarded an ijara
(contract) to collect fines for three years between 17911794 in the locality of Thate mine (LM/1848 BS [1791-1792],
PN. 3). Hamilton had also noted that various fines collected
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portion of revenue for the state (Hamilton 1971: 218). For
instance, the following salary were met from the fines
collected: Tahasildar, Rs. 50; Thabildar, Rs. 35; Bahidar, Rs
35; Pyadas, Rs 25 (RRC 38: 699-700).
31. “Land Grant to Hulas Giri”. LM/1849 BS [1792-1793],
PN. 3.

34. DNA/12/4; DNA/12/50.
35. LM/1855-56 VS [1798-1800], ff: 38-40. Bir Bhadra Pandit
was required to observe the state prescribed rituals.
36. State reserved the final authority to confirm the
parcellation of property as it did when Mahant Trilok Giri
passed away and his property was distributed amongst his
descendants taking into account that they had not violated
the established code for Das Nami sect. LM/1849.
37. State astrologers who regularly failed at predicting
and preventing omens were severely punished (Vajracarya
1980: 248-256).
38. Local officials who had confiscated property belonging
to the monastery of one Sakhya Lama were punished and
the property was restored. LM/1849 BS [1792-1793], PN 3.
39. LM/1849 BS [1791-1792], PN 3.
40. Order to Somai Dhami authorizing him to collect ritual
expenses”. NA/FMD/1/67
41. LM/1849 VS [1792-1793], PN. 3.
42. “Order to Dinanath Upadhyaya to reinstate the land
belonging to Laxmi Dhar” LM/1851 BS [1794-1795], PN. 83,
SN. 5103.
43. “Order to Indra Mani Basnet and Garva Khawas to
check local exploitation”. LM/1848 BS [1791-1792], PN. 3.
44. LM/1848 BS [1791-1792], PN. 3.
45. LM/1851 BS [1794-1795], PN. 83, SN. 5103
46. ‘Regulations for Limbu”. LM/1866 BS [1809-1810]/
BN. 29, PN. 8, SN. 33. The order warned the Limbus of
Chayanpur not to collect more than Rs. 50 and demand
slaves as bride price.
47. LM/1851 VS [1794-1795], PN. 83, SN. 5103. When one
Chapan Singh Khatri complained that distant members
of his agnatic clan had taken his ancestral property the
central regime intervened and passed a verdict, which
stated that as long as a son of the deceased member of
the agnatic clan was alive others could not inherit the
property.
48. LM/1876 BS [1819-1820], BN. 51, PN. 14, SN. 37, f. 2.

32. For a seminal work outlining this process in the Bengal
Delta under the Mughals, see (Eaton 1993)

49. An 1809 royal order of King Girvana disallowed the
practice of slavery in the border regions adjoining Tarai
and Tibet even though such practices had been prevalent
since ancient times (Naraharinath 1966: 68-69).

33. The statewide confiscation of birta (religious land
grant) in 1805 is one such case; see (Nepali 2057 BS).

50. In the year 1809 between Rs 12,00 to Rs 15,000 was
estimated as an income for the state from the rigorous
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implementation of the ban on cow slaughter in Bhadgaon
area. RRS 1: 16.

were authorized to ensure the effectiveness of the royal
regulations (RRC 2: 86).

51. Yaks were excluded from the category of cows in
extreme northern regions. In many places consumption
of beef was allowed if the animal had fallen off the cliff.
Local people might have utilized this exception to their
advantage. Also if the cow was killed accidentally while
herding, the person was only fined (Rs. 1) as long as the
state was informed of the incident.

64. The Ranas implemented this with even greater rigor
after 1846 (Bhattarai 2059 BS; Gautam 2004; Pangeni 2064
BS).

52. LM/1866 BS [1809], f. 7.

66. RRC 40: 349

53. The fines on Cobblers were rated at 4 paisa while other
carrion consuming jatis were fined 2 paisa. LM/1853 BS
[1795], f. 113.

67. The official records speak clearly of slave girls
becoming sati at the death of reigning kings. NA/
DNA/14/41. This particular record from 1777 states that
eight Palace slave women committed sati when King
Pratap Singh died. Slaves at times were also handed out by
the state as salary to its officials (RRC 5: 716).

54. Gurungs partaking in beef eating were barred from
military service. The order interestingly did not make
reference to any past order or Shastras as a precedence for
the new regulations thus being enforced.
55. In 1811, the regime ruled that all Gurungs were free to
participate in commensal relations with each other and to
marry freely within the jati without losing their jati status.
Anyone refusing to respect these rules and asserting
higher status within the jati was subject to punishment
and a fine of Rs. 20. DNA/12/53.
56. When influential Magars requested the Durbar to
have their caste rules and regulations enacted, a new
rule was stipulated. It prohibited Magars from taking
food from those lower in the caste hierarchy. Members
found violating the commensality rule were to be excommunicated.
57. LM/1848 BS [1791], PN. 3.
58. LM/1878 BS [1821-1822], BN. 53, PN. 14, SN. 39, f. 37.
59. LM/1883 BS [1826-1827], BN. 58, PN. 16, SN. 79, f. 18.
60. This order is from the year 1781 (RRC 5: 618-619). The
state issued two separate orders in 1826 warning the local
officials who had coerced Chudyaras for unpaid labor labor
(RRC 37: 186).
61. Parshu Ram Joshi and Haji Ram Joshi were appointed
judges with the jurisdiction to oversee the region between
west of Chepya-Marsyangdi River and east of Bheri and
ordered to refer to the royal decrees when adjudicating
cases (RRC 9:323).
62. LM/1866 [1809]/BN. 29, PN. 8, SN.33
63. Krishna Kanta Lohani and Uma Kanta Jaisi Sapkota
were not given any specific office titles, but the amalidars
(tax officials) in the region were informed that the two

65. Pancha khat (five major criminal offences) included:
killing of a Brahman; cow, woman; infant, and unlawful
sexual intercourse, such as incest).

68. The state’s appeal to the local people to return to
their village assured them that they would not be under
the jurisdiction of said judge, and requested to deposit
the assigned revenue directly with Subba Bhavani Dutta
Thapa. LM/1866 BS [1809], f. 56.
69. LM/1866 BS [1809-1810], f. 81. The state instructed that
if the case could not be resolved, the concerned parties
were to be dispatched to Kathmandu.
70. LM/1878 BS [1821-1822], BN. 53, PN. 14, SN. 39, f. 36.
71. LM/1883 BS [1827-1828], BN. 58, PN. 16, SN. 79, f. 21.
72. LM/1876 BS [1819-1820], BN. 51, PN. 14, SN. 37, f. 38.
73. One of the examples of this was when the state
began to disallow local officials and powerholders from
extracting coerced labor without prior approval from the
Durbar. At the same time, the state reserved the right to
mobilize such labor as it deemed necessary for various
projects of state building.
74. FMD/1/66, f. 2.
75. RRC 62: 92-94
76. The questionnaires were directed to the local
informers employed by Hogdson to help him record court
proceedings in Nepal.
77. Narmadeshwor Dhakal and Rupnarayan Dhakal
approached the Court with a complaint against Dalmardan
Shah when the latter confiscated their birta land.
The regime ordered Sardar Shambhu Lal and Subedar
Hansamani Khawas to look into the matter and inform the
Durbar of its findings. LM/1851 BS [1794-1795], PN. 83, SN.
5103.
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78. “Order to Ranbir Thapa to Restore Guthi Land”.
LM/1876/BN. 51, PN. 14, SN. 37.
79. I borrow this term from Corrigan & Sayer who
have highlighted a similar expansion of legal and moral
authority of the state in pre-modern England. See
(Corrigan & Sayer 1985).

Baral, Leelanteshwar Sharma. 1964. Life and Writing of
Prithvi Narayan Shah. Unpublished PhD Dissertation
(University of London).
Bayly, Christopher A. 2007. Empire and Information:
Intelligence Gathering and Social Communication in India, 17801870. New Delhi: Cambridge University Press.

80. This characterization of the early Gorkhali state thus
also elides the definition of ‘feudal’, for an interesting
discussion of which, see (Mukhia 1999).

Bayly, Christopher A. 1983. Rulers, Townsmen, and Bazars:
North Indian Society in the Age of British Expansion, 1770-1870.
Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

References

Bhattarai, Ghanshyam. BS 2059 (2002). Ranakalin Jilla
Prasasan ma Badahakimharuko Bhumika. Kathmandu: Center
for Nepal and Asian Studies.

Unpublished Sources
Documents Nepal Archives (DNA)- National Archives,
Kathmandu
Foreign Ministry Documents (FMD)- National Archives,
Kathmandu
Hogdson Collection (HC)- British Library, London
Lal Mohar (LM)- Record’s Office, Department of Land
Reform & Management, Kathmandu
Nijamati Thamauti (NT)- National Archives, Kathmandu
Rajpatra- Ministry of Law and Justice, Kathmandu
Regmi Research Collection (RRC)- Tribhuvan University
Central Library, Kathmandu
Regmi Research Series (RRS)- Dilli Raman Regmi Library,
Kathmandu
Published Sources
Acharya, Baburam and Yogi Naraharinath, ed. BS 2061
(2004). Badamaharajadhiraj Sri Panch Prithvi Narayan
Shah Ko Divya Upadesh. Kathmandu: Antarastriya Manch
Chapakhana.

Bouillier, Veronique. 1993. The Nepalese State and the
Gorkhnathi Yogis: The Case of the Former Kingdoms of
Dang Valley: 18-19th Centuries. Contribution to Nepalese
Studies 20 (1): 29-52.
Bouillier, Veronique. 1991. The Growth and Decay of a
Kanphata Yogi Monastery in South-West Nepal. The Indian
Economic and Social History Review 28 (2): 151-170.
Burghart, Richard. 1984. The Formation of the Concept of
Nation-State in Nepal. The Journal of Asian Studies 44 (1):
101-125.
Chatterjee, Indrani. 2013. Forgotten Friends: Monks, Marriages,
and Memories of Northeast India. Delhi: Oxford University
Press.
Chatterjee, Indrani. 1999. Gender, Slavery, and Law in Colonial
India. New Delhi: Oxford University Press.
Cohn, Bernard. 1996. Colonialism and Its Forms of Knowledge:
The British in India. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press.
Corrigan, Philip Richard and Derek Sayer. 1985. The Great
Arch: English State Formation as Cultural Revolution. Oxford,
UK: Blackwell.

Acharya, Baburam. BS 2063 (2006). Aba Testo Kahile Nahosh.
Kathmandu: Antarastriya Manch Chapakhana.

Des Chene, Mary. 2007. Is Nepal in South Asia? The
Conditions of Non-Postcoloniality. Studies in Nepali History
and Society 12 (2): 207-223.

Acharya, Baburam. BS 2061 (2004). Sri Panch
Badamaharajadhiraj Prithvi Narayan Shah Ko Samkshipta
Jivani. Kathmandu: Sajha Prakashan.

Dirks, Nicholas B. 1987. The Hollow Crown: Ethnohistory of
an Indian Kingdom. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University
Press.

Ali Riaz and Subho Basu. 2010. Paradise Lost? State Failure in
Nepal (Lanham: Lexington Books.

Dumont, Louis. Homo Hierarchicus: The Caste System and
its Implications. Translated by Mark Sainsbury. Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1970.

Appadurai, Arjun. 1977. Kings, Sects and Temple in South
India. Indian Economic and Social History Review 15 (1): 47-73.

84 | HIMALAYA Fall 2015

Eaton, Richard. 1993. The Rise of Islam and the Bengal Frontier,
1204-1760. Berkeley: University of California Press.

English, Richard. 1985. Himalayan State Formation and the
Impact of British Rule in the Nineteenth Century. Mountain
Research and Development 5 (1): 61-78.
Faruqi, Munis D. 2012. Princes of The Mughal Empire, 15041719. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
Forbes, Ann Armbrecht. 1995. The Boundary Keepers:
The Politics and Poetics of Land in Northeastern Nepal.
Unpublished PhD Dissertation (Harvard University).
Fukazawa, Hiroshi. 1998. The Medieval Deccan: Peasants,
Social Systems and States, Sixteenth to Eighteenth Century.
Delhi: Oxford University Press.

Kirkpatrick, William. 1969. An Account of the Kingdom of
Nepaul: Being the Substance of Observations Made During a
Mission to that Country, in the Year 1793. New Delhi: Manjushri
Publishing House.
Kulke, Hermann. 1995. The State in India, 1000-1700. New
Delhi: Oxford University Press.
Lecomte-Tilouine, Marie. 2009. Hindu Kingship, Ethnic
Revival, and Maoist Rebellion in Nepal. New Delhi: Oxford
University Press.
Levi, Sylvain. Hindu Adhirajya Ko Itihas, 2 Vols. 2005.
Kathmandu: Himal Books.

Gautam, Rajesh. 2004. Ranakalin Nepal ko Prasasanik, Saichik
ra Samajik Sudharharu. Delhi: Adroit Publishers.

Levine, Nancy. 1987. Caste, State, and Ethnic Boundaries in
Nepal. The Journal of Asian Studies 46 (1): 71-88.

Guha, Sumit. 2013. Beyond Caste: Identity and Power in South
Asia, Past and Present. Leiden: Brill.

Michael, Bernardo. 2012. State Making and Territory in South
Asia: Lessons From the Anglo-Gorkha War (1814-1816). London:
Anthem Press.

Guha, Sumit. 2003. The Politics of Identity and
Enumeration in India c. 1600-1900. Comparative Studies in
Society and History 45 (1): 148-167.
Guha, Sumit. 1995. An Indian Penal Regime: Maharashtra in
the Eighteenth Century. Past and Present 147: 101-126.
Guneratne, Arjun. 2002. Many Tongues, One People: The
Making of Tharu Identity in Nepal. Ithaca: Cornell University
Press.
Hamilton, Francis B. 1971 [1819]. An Account of the Kingdom
of Nepal. New Delhi: Manjusri Publishing House.
Hasan, Farhat. 2004. State and Locality in Mughal India: Power
Relations in Western India c. 1572-1730. UK: University of
Cambridge Press.
His Majesty’s Government of Nepal (HMG). BS 2022 (1965).
Sri Panch Surendra Bikram Shah Ko Pala Ma Baneko Muluki Ain.
Kathmandu: Ministry of Law and Justice.
Hocart, A. M. Kingship. 1927. London: Oxford University
Press.
Höfer, Andras. 2005 [1979]. The Caste Hierarchy and the State
in Nepal: A Study of the Muluki Ain of 1854. Kathmandu: Himal
Books.
Hogdson, Brian H. 1880. Miscellaneous Essays Relating to
Indian Subjects Vol. II. London: Trubner & Co., Ludgate Hill.
Holmberg, David. 1989. Order in Paradox: Myth, Ritual, and
Exchange Among Nepal’s Tamang. Ithaca: Cornell University
Press.
Inden, Ronald. 1990. Imaging India. Oxford, UK; Cambridge;
USA: Basil Blackwell.

Naraharinath, Yogi, ed. 1966. Itihas Prakashma Sandhi Patra
Sangraha. Dang: Yogi Naraharinath.
Nepali, Chittaranjan. BS 2057 (2000). Sri Panch Rana Bahadur
Shah: Byaktitwa ra Sasankaal. Kathmandu: Ratna Pustak
Bhandar.
Nepali, Chittaranjan. BS 2022 (1965). General Bhimsen Thapa
ra Tatkalin Nepal. Kathmandu: Ratna Pustak Bhandar.
Onta, Pratyoush R. 1996. The Politics of Bravery: A History
of Nepali Nationalism. Unpublished PhD Dissertation
(University of Pennsylvania).
Ortner, Sherry B. 1978. Sherpas Through Rituals. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Pangeni, Bhabeshwor. BS 2064 (2007). Nepal Ko Prasasanik
Itihas 1825-1903 BS Kathmandu: Bidhyarthi Pustak Bhandar.
Pant, Dinesh Raj. BS 2026 (1969). Swami Maharaj Rana
Bahadur Shah Ko 1862 BS Ko Bandobasta”. Purnima 6 (4):
238-244.
Pant, Dinesh Raj. 1985. Gorkha Ko Itihas, 4 Vols. Kathmandu:
Dinesh Raj Pant.
Pant, Naya Raj. 1968. Sri Panch Prithvi Narayan Shah Ko
Upadesh, 5 Vols. Patan: Jagdamba Prakashan.
Pant, Naya Raj. 1954. The Meaning of the Word Nepala.
Nepali Prose Selections, III. Kathmandu: Nepali Bhasa
Prakasini Samiti.
Peabody, Norbert. 2002. Hindu Kingship and Polity in PreColonial India. London: Cambridge University Press.

HIMALAYA Volume 35, Number 2 | 85

Pignede, B. 1962. Clan Organization and Hierarchy among
the Gurungs. Contribution to Indian Sociology 6: 102-19.
Pinch, William R. 2006. Warrior Ascetics and Indian Empires.
Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
Quigley, Declan, ed. 2005. The Character of Kingship. Oxford;
New York: Berg.
Ragsdale, Tom. 1990. Gurungs, Gorkhalis, Gurkhas:
Speculations on a Nepalese Ethno-History. Contribution to
Nepalese Studies 17 (1): 1-24.
Rai, Mridu. 2004. Hindu Rulers, Muslim Subjects: Islam, Rights,
and the History of Kashmir. Princeton: Princeton University
Press.
Rajbangsi, Shankar Man, ed. BS 2020 (1963). Puratatwo Patra
Sangraha Vol. 2. Kathmandu: Department of Archeology.
Regmi, Dilli Raman. 1975 [1961]. Modern Nepal: Rise and
Growth in the Eighteenth Century. Calcutta: Mukhopadhyay.
Regmi, Jagadishcandra. 1979. Nepalko Vaidhanik Parampara:
Paramparadekhi 1846 Samma Kathmandu: Tribhuvan
University.
Regmi, Mahesh Chandra. 1976 [1963]. Landownership in
Nepal. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Regmi, Mahesh C. 1971. A Study in Nepali Economic History,
1768-1846. New Delhi: Manjusri Publishing House.
Rupakheti, Sanjog. 2012. Leviathan or Paper Tiger: State
Making in the Himalayas, 1740-1900. Unpublished PhD
Dissertation (Rutgers University).
Shrestha, Tek Bahadur, ed. BS 2058 (2001). Nepalka Rajaharu
Tatha Taraika Tharu. Tribhuvan University, Kathmandu:
Center for Nepal and Asian Studies.
Shaha, Rishikesh.1990. Modern Nepal: A Political History, 17691955. New Delhi: Manohar.
Singh, Dilbagh. Regulating the Domestic: Notes on the
Pre-Colonial State and the Family. Studies in History 19 (1):
69-86.
Stein, Burton. 1980. Peasant, State, and Society in Medieval
South India. Delhi: Oxford University Press.
Stiller, Ludwig F. 1976. The Silent Cry: The People of Nepal,
1816-1839. Kathmandu: Sahayogi Prakashan.
Vajracarya, Dhanvajra. 1980. Shahkalko Abhilekh.
Kathmandu: Nepal and Asian Studies Center
Vajracarya, Dhanvajra. 1975. Nuvakotko Aitihasik Ruprekha.
Kathmandu: Nepal and Asian Studies Center.

86 | HIMALAYA Fall 2015

Vajracarya, Dhanvajra and Gyanmani Nepal. BS 2014
(1957). Atihashik Patra Sangraha Vol.1. Katmandu: Nepal
Sanskritik Parishad.
Vanini, Fulgentius. 1977. Christian Settlements in Nepal
During the Eighteenth Century. Agra: Capuchin Ashram.
Wasti, Prakash, ed. BS 2066 (2009). Kanoon Sambandhi Kehi
Aithihasik Abhilekhharu. Kathmandu: Kanoon Bayabasahi
Club.
Wink, Andre. 1986. Land and Sovereignty in India: Agrarian
Society and Politics Under the Eighteenth-century Maratha
Svarajya. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Yang, Anand A. 1989. The Limited Raj: Agrarian Relations in
Colonial India, Saran District, 1793-1920. California: University
of Berkeley Press.

